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A B S T R A C T
For security and justice professionals (e.g., police officers, lawyers, judges), the thousands of peer-reviewed articles 
on nonverbal communication represent important sources of knowledge. However, despite the scope of the scientific 
work carried out on this subject, professionals can turn to programs, methods, and approaches that fail to reflect the 
state of science. The objective of this article is to examine (i) concepts of nonverbal communication conveyed by these 
programs, methods, and approaches, but also (ii) the consequences of their use (e.g., on the life or liberty of individuals). 
To achieve this objective, we describe the scope of scientific research on nonverbal communication. A program (SPOT; 
Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques), a method (the BAI; Behavior Analysis Interview) and an approach 
(synergology) that each run counter to the state of science are examined. Finally, we outline five hypotheses to explain 
why some organizations in the fields of security and justice are turning to pseudoscience and pseudoscientific techniques. 
We conclude the article by inviting these organizations to work with the international community of scholars who have 
scientific expertise in nonverbal communication and lie (and truth) detection to implement evidence-based practices.
Análisis de la comunicación no verbal: los peligros de la pseudociencia en 
entornos de seguridad y justicia
R E S U M E N
Para los profesionales de la seguridad y la justicia (policías, abogados, jueces), los miles de artículos revisados por pares 
sobre comunicación no verbal representan fuentes importantes de conocimiento. Sin embargo, a pesar del alcance del 
trabajo científico realizado sobre este tema, los profesionales pueden recurrir a programas, métodos y enfoques que no 
reflejan el estado real de la ciencia. El objetivo de este artículo es examinar (i) los conceptos de comunicación no verbal 
transmitidos por estos programas, métodos y enfoques, pero también (ii) las consecuencias de su uso (por ejemplo, sobre 
la vida o la libertad de las personas). Para lograr estos objetivos, describimos el alcance de la investigación científica sobre 
la comunicación no verbal. Se examina un programa (SPOT: Evaluación de pasajeros mediante técnicas de observación), 
un método (BAI: Entrevista de análisis de conducta) y un enfoque (sinergología) que contradicen el estado de la ciencia. 
Finalmente, presentamos cinco hipótesis para explicar por qué algunas organizaciones en los campos de la seguridad y la 
justicia están recurriendo a la pseudociencia y a las técnicas pseudocientíficas. Concluimos el artículo invitando a estas 
organizaciones a trabajar con la comunidad académica internacional especializada en la investigación sobre comunicación 
no verbal y detección de mentiras (y verdad) para implementar prácticas basadas en la evidencia.
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Nonverbal communication generally refers to any communication 
made other than by words (Knapp, Hall, & Horgan, 2014; Patterson, 
2011). For example, a person’s physical and vocal characteristics 
transmit information. Nonverbal behaviors (e.g., facial expressions, 
gestures) and interpersonal distances also play an important role in 
face-to-face interactions (Burgoon, Guerrero, & Floyd, 2010; Moore, 
Hickson, & Stacks, 2014). The volume, the range, and the complexity 
of scientific research on nonverbal communication may be seen 
from comprehensive handbooks on the topic published in recent 
years (Hall & Knapp, 2013; Manusov & Patterson, 2006; Matsumoto, 
Hwang, & Frank, 2016). 
For security and justice professionals (e.g., police officers, lawyers, 
judges), the thousands of peer-reviewed articles on nonverbal 
communication represent important sources of knowledge, including 
on the detection of lies or mal-intent (Granhag & Strömwall, 2004; 
Granhag, Vrij, & Verschuere, 2015; Vrij, 2008). Lying, however, 
cannot be detected at a glance as is often stated on the Internet. 
The belief that gaze avoidance allows lie detection is a widespread 
misconception (The Global Deception Research Team, 2006). Like 
the unrealistic expectations of the public toward forensic science 
(Chin & Workewych, 2016), nonverbal communication has suffered 
from its popularity in television series (e.g., Lie to Me) and other 
popular media (Levine, Serota, & Shulman, 2010; Vrij, Granhag, & 
Porter, 2010). In fact, scholars who have scientific expertise in lie (and 
truth) detection agree that there are no nonverbal behaviors that are 
present in all liars and are absent in all people who tell the truth. 
There are no nonverbal behaviors that are indicative of deception, 
such as Pinocchio’s nose (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008). In addition, 
when facial expressions and gestures are documented as having 
a link to lying, this link is typically weak (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij 
et al., 2017) and often moderated by situational variables (Sporer & 
Schwandt, 2006, 2007). In other words, although not a silver bullet, 
the analysis of an individual’s nonverbal behaviors can be based on 
knowledge published in peer-reviewed scientific journals. In fact, 
research conducted by the international community of scholars who 
have scientific expertise in nonverbal communication can inform 
understanding of a wide range of human behaviors (Burgoon et al., 
2010; Knapp et al., 2014; Moore et al., 2014; Patterson, 2011). 
Despite the wealth of peer-reviewed knowledge on nonverbal 
communication, security and justice professionals can readily find 
widely disseminated programs, methods, and approaches that fail 
to reflect the state of science and promote pseudoscientific claims. 
The objective of this article is to examine (i) concepts of nonverbal 
communication conveyed by these programs, methods, and 
approaches, but also (ii) the consequences of their use. To achieve this 
objective, we will describe the scope of scientific research on nonverbal 
communication. Subsequently, we will examine a program aimed at 
identifying aviation security threats through monitoring the nonverbal 
behaviors and appearance of passengers at U.S. airports (SPOT; Screening 
of Passengers by Observation Techniques), an interview method used 
by many police forces (the BAI; Behavior Analysis Interview) and an 
approach to “read gestures” taught to security and justice professionals, 
including in France and Quebec (synergology). Finally, we will outline 
five hypotheses to explain why some organizations in the fields of 
security and justice are turning to pseudoscience and pseudoscientific 
techniques. We will conclude the article by inviting these organizations 
to work with the international community of scholars who have 
scientific expertise in nonverbal communication and lie (and truth) 
detection to implement evidence-based practices.
The Scope of Scientific Research on Nonverbal 
Communication
Many of the issues facing security and justice professionals involve 
the concealment and falsification of information (e.g., Garrido, Masip, 
& Herrero, 2004; Mann, Garcia-Rada, Houser, & Ariely, 2014; Vrij, 
Mann, Jundi, Hillman, & Hope, 2014). When it comes to developing 
better professional practices to address these issues, the analysis of 
nonverbal communication may, on the face of it, seem foolproof. 
Indeed, it is not uncommon to read or hear that facial expressions and 
gestures can be used to detect lies, and that they would be more valid 
in this regard than words. Security and justice professionals would 
therefore have at their fingertips, for a few thousand, or even a few 
hundred dollars, programs, methods, and approaches to know what 
the other person thinks but does not say.
Unfortunately, dubious concepts regarding nonverbal 
communication are widely disseminated, particularly on the Internet 
and in books aimed at the general public, as well as at seminars 
and conferences (such as “the body language never lies”). The use 
of such concepts can have negative and perhaps even disastrous 
consequences (Denault, 2015; Kozinski, 2015; Lilienfeld & Landfield, 
2008). For example, security and justice professionals who are not 
familiar with the “peer-review” process can be misled into believing 
that these dubious concepts are scientific and give them a totally 
unjustified authority (Jupe & Denault, 2018). As we will demonstrate, 
the reliance on such concepts is fundamentally misguided, because 
decisions of security and justice professionals could be distorted and 
harm the life or liberty of individuals.
Although the detection of lies or mal-intent may be of interest to 
these professionals, it represents only a small part of the scientific 
research being conducted on nonverbal communication. As 
Plusquellec and Denault (2018) pointed out, the influence of culture, 
age, and mental illness on nonverbal communication, as well as the 
recognition of facial expressions and interpersonal sensitivity, are 
just some of the subjects receiving attention from a community 
of researchers from all over the world. Nonverbal communication 
is not a subject of scientific research in which psychology alone is 
concerned. For example, psychiatry, criminology, communication, 
linguistics, biology, sociology, anthropology, computer science, and 
ethology also focus on nonverbal communication. Regardless of the 
discipline, the affiliation of researchers, and their fields of research, 
the knowledge they develop is of great value because the process of 
critical appraisal of knowledge (the publication process), which is a 
central building block in establishing confidence in the results of a 
research project, remains the same. Let us examine briefly just how 
this process unfolds. 
When completing a research project, the researcher generally 
prepares a manuscript describing the reasons and theoretical 
rationale for the study, as well as all the steps preceding its 
conclusions, including the methodology, data collection, and 
analyses. All these details will eventually allow the international 
scientific community to scrutinize the research project to provide 
support or criticism of the results in full knowledge of the facts 
(e.g., in the light of other research on the subject). All these details 
will also provide other researchers the opportunity to replicate 
the study and compare the results (Asendorpf et al., 2013; Jupe 
& Denault, 2018; Shipman, 2014; Ware, 2008). The manuscript 
is then submitted to the editor of a scientific journal who sends 
it to experts on the subject for a first critical evaluation. This is 
the “peer-review” process. Manuscripts are commonly reviewed 
double-blind, meaning that the names of the reviewers are not 
known to the researcher and the name of the researcher is not 
known to the reviewers. The reviewers provide feedback to 
the editor. Following the reviewers’ feedback and his/her own 
evaluation of the manuscript, the editor informs the researcher 
that the manuscript is accepted as it is, with either minor or major 
revisions, or that it is rejected (sometimes with the possibility to 
revise and resubmit the manuscript after significant improvements) 
(Denault & Dunbar, 2017; Jupe & Denault, 2018). Some scientific 
journals in psychology have a rejection rate of up to 90% (American 
Psychological Association, 2017). Since the 1960s, approximately 
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30,000 peer-reviewed articles on nonverbal communication have 
been published (Plusquellec & Denault, 2018).
Pseudoscience in the Security and Justice Community
Despite the extent of scientific research on nonverbal 
communication (Burgoon et al., 2010; Knapp et al., 2014; Moore et 
al., 2014; Patterson, 2011), security and justice professionals in some 
jurisdictions have turned to programs, methods, and approaches 
that fail to reflect the state of science. The consequences of the 
misuses of nonverbal communication are important enough to 
question the responsibility of organizations in the fields of security 
and justice that have used either SPOT, the BAI, or synergology.
SPOT
Standing for Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques, 
SPOT is a program aimed at identifying aviation security threats 
through monitoring the nonverbal behaviors and appearance of 
passengers. This program was implemented at numerous U.S. airports 
by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) following the September 
11, 2001 attacks. Based on Israeli methods for attempting to detect 
suspicious behaviors, SPOT was implemented in 2006 and 2007 at 
42 TSA-regulated airports after being tested in 2003 and 2004 “to 
understand the potential of the program, not to validate its success” 
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010, p. 25). In 2010, nearly 
3,000 Behavior Detection Officers (hereinafter referred to as BDOs) 
were deployed at 161 of the 457 airports regulated by the TSA. SPOT 
had an annual cost of approximately $212 million (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2010). 
According to the TSA, SPOT was based on several sources, namely 
learning tools from federal agencies, comments from law enforcement 
officers (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement 
Agency), and the work of researchers, including Paul Ekman, who 
attempted to defend it before a committee of the U.S. Congress in 
2011 (Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 2011). However, 
at the time of the implementation of SPOT, the validity of identifying 
aviation security threats through monitoring the nonverbal behaviors 
and appearance of passengers was unknown. The effectiveness of 
identifying aviation security threats using SPOT versus random 
questioning (i.e., questioning passengers at random rather than on 
the basis of behavioral indicators) was also unknown. According to 
the TSA, SPOT was implemented because it was low cost, was easy 
to set up, and provided an additional security measure for risks that 
were not covered by other measures (U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2010). 
For the identification of aviation security threats, SPOT employed 
the BDOs. These individuals were recruited from TSA employees who 
had performed passenger and baggage screening. They received four 
days of classroom and three days of field training and took an exam. 
The BDOs were required, among other things, to memorize the list of 
indicators to identify potential terrorists (e.g., avoiding eye contact, 
looking down, wearing clothing inappropriate for the location, having 
a pale face due to recent beard shaving, emitting a strong body odor, 
covering the mouth with the hand when speaking; The Intercept, 
2015; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010). At airports, the 
BDOs’ job was to observe waiting passengers (about 30 seconds per 
passenger). An exchange with a passenger could be initiated during 
this observation procedure. Following the exchange, if the passenger 
exceeded a certain score (from the list of 94 behavioral indicators), 
BDOs could conduct a pat-down and a search of his/her luggage. They 
could then invite the passenger to continue his/her journey or contact 
the law enforcement officers who then had the option to arrest the 
passenger. In addition, when the passenger was not arrested, the 
TSA could still refuse to allow him/her to board the aircraft. Finally, 
the BDOs were to enter information about their intervention into a 
database (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010, 2013, 2017).
In 2010, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), an 
organization with a similar role to the Office of the Auditor General 
of Canada, recommended that the TSA bring together independent 
experts to validate the scientific basis of SPOT (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2010). Three years later, the GAO recommended 
that the U.S. Congress consider the absence of scientific evidence on 
the effectiveness of identifying aviation security threats through 
the nonverbal behaviors of passengers in its SPOT funding decisions 
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013). Finally, in 2017, 
the GAO published a report according to which 175 out of the 178 
(98%) sources cited by the TSA were not relevant for determining 
the validity of SPOT. Indeed, of the 178 sources cited, only 20 were 
research articles reporting data and methods. Of the remaining 158 
sources, 21 were literature reviews that did not report adequate 
information, and 137 were opinion papers or documents that 
provided irrelevant information for establishing the scientific basis of 
SPOT (e.g., newspaper articles, screenshots of medical websites). The 
20 research articles were independently evaluated by two analysts: 
5 articles did not meet generally accepted research standards and 12 
did not validate the behavioral indicators for which they were cited 
by the TSA. One source justified seven of these indicators and two 
sources justified only one. In other words, the TSA did not have any 
evidentiary source to support the validity of 28 of the 36 indicators on 
the revised list used by the BDOs to identify aviation security threats2. 
The GAO has therefore maintained its 2013 recommendations to limit 
SPOT funding (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2017).
Following the 2017 report, as did the TSA in 2004 (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2010), DHS attempted to defend 
SPOT, in some cases by using logical fallacies (e.g., overreliance on 
anecdotal evidence; Gambrill, 2005; Lilienfeld & Landfield, 2008). 
For example, it was reported that a passenger identified by BDOs 
was carrying 4.4 kilograms of cocaine and that the techniques used 
to hide drugs could be used to hide explosives. In addition, the TSA 
replied that the BDOs had been reassigned as Transportation Security 
Officers required to perform behavioral analysis for a few hours 
a day to maintain their skills. However, given the lack of scientific 
evidence on the effectiveness of identifying aviation security threats 
through the nonverbal behaviors of passengers, the GAO expressed 
concern that behavior analysis was still being used (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2017). 
It should be noted that proponents of SPOT may claim that this 
program worked because a terrorist act such as that of September 
11, 2001 has not occurred again. However, this is another logical 
fallacy. Although SPOT can deter some terrorists, just as dummy 
cameras can deter some thieves, this does not mean SPOT actually 
works. Furthermore, security and justice organizations should not 
use tragedies to justify dubious programs, methods, and approaches 
and avoid putting in place programs, methods, and approaches that 
actually work.
The use of logical fallacies to justify the importance of SPOT (a 
program estimated to have cost $1.5 billion from 2007 to 2015; Office 
of Inspector General, 2016) seems at best questionable, especially 
since SPOT created “an unacceptable risk of racial and religious 
profiling” (ACLU, 2017, p. 1). Indeed, rather than detecting terrorists, 
behavioral indicators have led BDOs to target immigrants. Moreover, 
“until late 2012, training materials for behavior detection officers 
focused exclusively on examples of Arab or Muslim terrorists” (ACLU, 
2017, p. 13; see also Winter, 2015). 
Did SPOT offer a false sense of security? Possibly. Could the financial 
resources allocated to the TSA (e.g., taxpayers’ money) have been 
invested in the development of new programs based on knowledge 
published in peer-reviewed scientific journals, as well as in programs 
that have already demonstrated their effectiveness? Certainly. For 
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example, rather than being invested in behavior analysis programs 
of unknown effectiveness, taxpayers’ money could be invested in 
local law enforcement, which is generally limited in personnel and 
financial resources, including the promotion of proactive policing 
and prosecution (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Howard, 2004; LaFree & 
Freilich, 2018). 
The TSA, however, does not appear to have questioned its 
approach following the 2017 report of the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office. Indeed, the Boston Globe (2018) recently 
revealed the existence of Quiet Skies, a TSA surveillance program 
where travelers (who are not under investigation and not on a 
terrorist watch list) are monitored by federal agents before they 
board an aircraft. This surveillance was partly based on behavioral 
indicators as dubious as those of SPOT (e.g., strong body odor, 
excessive perspiration, rapid eye blinking, hands that touch the 
face, recent beard shaving)3. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of 
using nonverbal behaviors for security controls at airports or to 
determine whether people are hiding an object is limited (Ormerod 
& Dando, 2015; Sweet, Meissner, & Atkinson, 2017). Moreover, 
observation of behavior alone reduces accuracy in judgments 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Bond, Howard, Hutchison, & Masip, 2013; 
Reinhard, Sporer, & Scharmach, 2013; Reinhard, Sporer, Scharmach, 
& Marksteiner, 2011). In other words, current scientific knowledge 
on nonverbal communication suggests that security and justice 
professionals should not rely on the observation of behavioral 
indicators (or combinations of some of them) in face-to-face 
interactions to detect terrorists. Dubious concepts regarding 
nonverbal communication, however, continue to be used, not only 
by Transportation Security Officers, but also by professionals from 
other backgrounds.
The BAI
Standing for Behavior Analysis Interview, the BAI is the first step 
of the Reid technique, an interrogation technique in which more 
than 500,000 people have reportedly been trained (John E. Reid & 
Associates, n.d.b, n.d.c). Essentially, in this first step, an investigator 
conducts a non-accusatory interview with a suspect. Special attention 
is paid to the suspect’s nonverbal behaviors when answering certain 
questions asked by the investigator (Snook, Eastwood, & Barron, 
2014; Vrij, 2008). According to the creators of the Reid technique, this 
interview method is “designed to identify whether or not a person 
is telling the truth or withholding relevant information concerning a 
specific crime or act of wrongdoing” (John E. Reid & Associates, n.d.a). 
For example, the BAI claims that some nonverbal behaviors are linked 
with deception (e.g., closed and retreated posture, frozen and static, 
non-frontal alignment, to lean forward constantly) or truthfulness 
(e.g., open and relaxed posture, dynamic, frontal alignment, to lean 
forward occasionally) (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013). At the 
end of the BAI, when the guilt of the suspect “in the opinion of the 
investigator, seems definite or reasonably certain” (Inbau et al., 2013, 
p. 185), the investigator proceeds to the second step of the Reid 
technique. The objective is then to obtain an incriminating statement 
through a psychologically coercive adversarial interrogation (Masip, 
Herrero, Garrido, & Barba, 2011; Snook et al., 2014; Vrij, 2008). 
In this second step, the investigator must state that there is no 
doubt in his/her mind that the suspect is guilty of the crime. The 
investigator then provides a moral excuse for the crime so that the 
suspect can “save face”. In addition, the investigator will ensure, by 
various means, that the suspect cannot deny involvement (e.g., by 
interrupting the suspect). Finally, “to elicit an initial admission of guilt” 
(Inbau et al., 2013, p. 294), the investigator asks the suspect a question 
to which both possible answers are incriminating, for example, “Was 
the stolen money used to buy your drugs or to help your family?”. 
Following the incriminating statement, the investigator requests 
details and proceeds to obtain a written statement (Inbau et al., 2013; 
Snook et al., 2014). Although it has many followers, especially in the 
United States, the Reid technique can lead to miscarriages of justice 
(e.g., Gudjonsson, 2014; St-Yves & Meissner, 2014).
The BAI is particularly alarming in its use of verbal and nonverbal 
behaviors in determining the suspect’s guilt or innocence. For 
example, according to Inbau et al. (2013), “shifts in the chair that 
occur during or immediately following a significant statement, such 
as denial, often indicate fear of detection and should be associated 
with deception” (p. 134), and “generally speaking, a suspect who does 
not make direct eye contact is probably withholding information” (p. 
135). However, even if these behaviors are “inconsistent with the 
existing research regarding the nonverbal behaviors of truthful and 
deceptive suspects” (Blair & Kooi, 2004, p. 82), they can add weight to 
the erroneous certainty of a person’s guilt or innocence.
In addition, the specific study often presented as supporting the 
BAI foundations (Horvath, Jayne, & Buckley, 1994) suffers from fatal 
methodological shortcomings (e.g., small sample, no comparison 
group of untrained or lay evaluators; Kassin, 2015; Masip et al., 2011; 
Vrij, 2008). In fact, experimental research does not support the BAI 
effectiveness (Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2006). As Harrigan (2005) pointed 
out, the state of science is clear: “Unlike certain facial expressions, 
there are few, if any, body movements that have invariant meaning 
within or across cultures” (p. 139). Furthermore, research has shown 
that the BAI guilt or innocence indicators merely reflect common 
popular misbeliefs about behavioral correlates of guilt or innocence 
(Masip, Barba, & Herrero, 2012; Masip & Herrero, 2013; Masip et 
al., 2011). In short, although some other aspects of BAI may offer 
avenues for research, believing that a suspect’s behavior following 
certain questions signals a suspect’s guilt or innocence has little or 
no scientific basis (Masip & Herrero, 2013; Vrij & Fisher, 2016; Vrij et 
al., 2006; Vrij et al., 2017; see also Masip, 2017, for a recent review of 
scientific research on deception detection). 
Of course, as for pseudoscience and pseudoscientific techniques, 
that is, bodies of information “that possess the superficial appearance 
of science but lack its substance” (Lilienfeld & Landfield, 2008, p. 
1216), precautions are formulated regarding behavioral indicators. 
For example, Inbau et al. (2013) stated that the validity of behavioral 
indicators may be influenced by “the perceived seriousness of the 
offense, the mental and the physical condition of the subject, any 
underlying psychiatric or personality disorders, level of intelligence, 
degree of maturity, and the extent or absence of social responsibilities” 
(p. 152). This call to caution, however, is of no use. Investigators 
cannot know all the variables that may influence an individual’s 
verbal and nonverbal behaviors. In addition, Inbau et al. (2013) do 
not explain how, in practice, all these factors actually influence all 
the behaviors that they link with deception or truthfulness. The 
same goes for precautions regarding specific behaviors. For example, 
regarding the lack of eye contact, Inbau et al. (2013) stated that it may 
result from various factors, including the suspect’s culture, as well 
as an inferiority complex and an emotional disorder. Worse still, in 
the case of the lack of eye contact, scientific research on nonverbal 
communication has even shown that it is not a valid sign of lying 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007).
In many other contexts, the dubious meanings that the BAI 
assigns to verbal and nonverbal behaviors might, on the face of it, 
appear amusing. When used by security and justice professionals, 
however, they can lead both innocent and guilty persons to be 
subjected to a psychologically coercive adversarial interrogation 
and increase the risk of innocent people (especially juveniles and 
other vulnerable persons) making false confessions (e.g., Horgan, 
Russano, Meissner, & Evans, 2012; Kassin, 2015; Kassin & Gudjonsson, 
2004; Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 
2005). The questionable meanings that the BAI assigns to verbal 
and nonverbal behaviors are especially worrying because the 
ability of investigators to detect lies based on nonverbal behaviors 
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is generally no better than chance (Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bogaard, 
Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016; Hauch, Sporer, Michael, & Meissner, 
2016). In addition, training in the Reid technique decreases the 
accuracy of these judgments, while, at the same time, increases 
investigators’ confidence in their accuracy (Kassin & Fong, 1999; 
Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2004; Meissner & Kassin, 2002). Despite all 
this, the creators of the Reid technique continue to “guarantee” 
that training in this technique allows to “increase your ability to 
eliminate the innocent, identify the guilty and motivate subject’s 
[sic] to tell the truth” (John E. Reid & Associates, n.d.c). In addition 
to the BAI and SPOT, other programs, methods, and approaches 
promote pseudoscientific claims. Synergology, an approach to 
“read gestures” taught to French-speaking security and justice 
professionals, is one of them.
Synergology
According to its “official” website, synergology is a “scientific 
discipline of reading gestures” which is “anchored in a multidisciplinary 
field at the crossroads of neurosciences and communication sciences” 
(Synergology, the Official Website, n.d.b, n.d.a, our translation). It 
purports to be “in this line of sciences which seek to better understand 
any body movement as an indicator of an unconscious mental process” 
(Monnin, 2009, p. 35, our translation). More specifically, proponents 
of synergology purport that it uses “several revolutionary techniques 
and methods derived from the most recent discoveries in the field of 
behavioral sciences” (Gagnon, n.d.b., our translation), and fills “the lack 
of a serious reference in nonverbal communication” (Bunard, 2018, p. 
47, our translation). In addition, proponents of synergology claim their 
approach was “founded to undo beliefs in popular communication” 
(Institut Québécois de Synergologie, 2016, our translation). They 
also claim that its use is restricted by a “code of ethics” (Association 
Européenne de Synergologie, n.d.).
To know what the other thinks “before the other has even accessed 
his own thoughts” (Bunard, 2018, p. 20, our translation), proponents 
of synergology say they have accumulated thousands of videos in 
databases and linked meanings to different gestures (Bunard, 2018; 
Gagnon & Martineau, 2010; Story, 2018). According to the founder 
of synergology, each association “must be verified in at least 80% of 
the situations resulting from databases images. In the case of micro 
itching, it must be verified in at least 90% of cases” (Turchet, 2009, p. 
299, our translation; see also Bunard, 2018; Turchet, 2012). 
For example, hand movements are supposedly of the utmost 
importance because “looking at the hands, following them in all their 
movements on the face and body seems to be the best way to decipher 
the emotions and therefore the thoughts of our interlocutor” (Turchet, 
2009, p. 103, our translation). Among the hand movements, micro 
itching (i.e. “unconscious itching relieved by the tip of the finger or 
nail”; Turchet, 2009, p. 311, our translation) supposedly occurs “always 
in embarrassing situations that provoke internal contradictions when 
we do not allow ourselves what we want, when we censor our words, 
our attitudes... therefore when we are uncomfortable” (Turchet, 2009, 
p. 112, our translation). In other words, a micro itching supposedly 
emerges “when there are contradictions between what is said and 
what is thought” (Gagnon & Martineau, 2010, p. 54, our translation; 
see also Monnin, 2009). Therefore, when a person scratches under 
the right nostril, it would mean that “I don’t believe what the other 
person says” (Turchet, 2009, p. 136, our translation) and when a 
person scratches under the left nostril, it would mean that “I don’t 
say everything, or not exactly, what I think” (Turchet, 2009, p. 136, 
our translation). When a person scratches on top of his/her nose on 
the right, that would indicate “something bothers me in what the 
other shows” (Turchet, 2009, p. 138, our translation) and when he/
she scratches on top of his/her nose on the left, that would indicate 
“there is something that disturbs my image” (Turchet, 2009, p. 138, 
our translation). According to Story (2018), “there are about fifteen 
ways to touch your nose, with very different interpretations” (p. 32, 
our translation). In total, more than 50 different points on the face 
would have different meanings when scratched (Turchet, 2009, 2012, 
2017). In addition, positions of the body on a chair and those of the 
head would also have different meanings (see Denault & Jupe, 2017, 
for an evaluation of a “synergological” analysis).
For example, a sitting person could be in a position of withdrawal 
(backward), analysis (backward to the right), escape (backward to 
the left), stress and discourse control (right), reserve and emotional 
control (left), attack (forward to the right), flexibility (forward to 
the left), and interest (forward) (Bunard, 2018; see also Gagnon & 
Martineau, 2010; Story, 2018). Moreover, “if the head is strongly bent 
to the left, then we speak of submission or abandonment depending 
on the context. If the head is strongly bent to the right, we speak then 
of rigidity” (Bunard, 2018, p. 100, our translation). In addition, when 
the head is turned to the right “we can assume that the relationship 
is good, that our interlocutor is confident, in a climate conducive to 
exchanges” (Story, 2018, p. 65, our translation) and when it is turned 
to the left “we can assume that he is more distant, that he analyses 
and classifies the information with his left brain and that as a result, 
he may, by nature or according to the context, be on the defensive or 
in search of performance” (Story, 2018, p. 65, our translation). 
Proponents of synergology have also associated different gestures 
with particular contexts, including that of lying. According to 
Gagnon & Martineau (2010), “the gap between truth and lies is never 
completely masked and the body transmits it” (p. 44, our translation; 
see also Bunard, 2018). For example, Story (2018) claims that a liar 
“tends to make two-dimensional gestures, mechanical, disembodied, 
rather large” (p. 182, our translation), because “only a person who has 
really experienced a situation can reproduce it in three dimensions, 
with gestures sometimes very close to the body and of low amplitude” 
(Story, 2018, p. 182, our translation). Gagnon and Martineau (2010) 
purport that when a person pinches his/her nose while telling the 
customs officer that he/she has nothing to declare, “the customs 
officer being alert to the nonverbal, should ask for assistance in order 
to carry out necessary checks since this gesture is closely linked to the 
unspoken” (p. 57, our translation). However, according to Gagnon and 
Martineau (2010), one should not rely on a single gesture, but “when 
you see an inconsistency between the gesture and the word, be sure 
to identify the subject of the discussion, because it is probably (not 
exclusively) on this point that the person lies, exaggerates or hides 
something” (p. 42, our translation). Therefore, synergology would 
“save time, open up new avenues for consideration and investigation 
by identifying authenticity more quickly” (Synergology, the Official 
Website, n.d.c, our translation). 
Despite the seemingly scientific and ethical claims of proponents 
of synergology, their approach neglects the process of critical 
appraisal of scientific research on nonverbal communication 
(Burgoon et al., 2010; Denault & Jupe, 2017; Harrigan, Rosenthal, & 
Scherer, 2005). To our knowledge, since the “creation” of synergology 
in 1996 (Synergology, the Official Website, n.d.e), the meanings this 
approach claims to have associated with different gestures (e.g., 
micro itching) have not been the subject of peer-reviewed articles. 
They “look like rabbits you would pull out of hats: you can’t see where 
they come from, and they magically appear” (Lardellier, 2008, p. 12, 
our translation; see also Axelrad, 2012; Jarry, 2016, 2018; Lardellier, 
2017). Furthermore, the effectiveness of seminars and conferences 
on synergology as well as the effectiveness of the 200-plus hours 
training to “become” a synergologist (at a cost of more than $6000 
CAD) is unknown, even though the founder of synergology stated 
that “our methods make it possible to detect 80% of lies in the test 
called ‘guilty/innocent’” (Turchet, 2009, p. 322, our translation; see 
also Turchet, 2012). 
To our knowledge, the founder of synergology has published 
only one peer-reviewed article in a scientific journal (Turchet, 2013), 
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which did not validate the meanings associated by synergologists to 
different gestures or the effectiveness of synergology. In addition, this 
article was severely criticized, particularly because of methodological 
and analytical defects (e.g., inappropriate comparison, data selection, 
circular reasoning), and “casts serious doubt on the thousands of 
gestures to which synergologists give a meaning” (Rochat, Delmas, 
Denault, Elissalde, & Demarchi, 2018, p. 262, our translation; see 
also Denault, Larivée, Plouffe, & Plusquellec, 2015). In other words, 
synergology purports to be “founded to undo beliefs in popular 
communication” (Institut Québécois de Synergologie, 2016, our 
translation), but it replaces them with concepts that have not been 
the subject of peer-reviewed articles. Moreover, a “code of ethics” 
cannot make up for the lack of scientific evidence, especially because, 
to our knowledge, no decision against a synergologist has been made 
public. Such a “code of ethics” (as well as the attribution of license 
numbers to synergologists) seems to mimic that of professional 
governing bodies, which are provided by law. As a result, some 
organizations could believe that synergology has an official cachet 
that it does not have.
In addition, although synergology neglects the process of critical 
appraisal of scientific research on nonverbal communication, the 
meanings this approach claims to have associated with different 
gestures have been widely disseminated, particularly on the Internet 
and in books for the general public (e. g., Gagnon & Martineau, 
2010; Turchet, 2004, 2009). One of these books, for example, was 
written because, according to one of the authors, “these people [the 
armed forces] didn’t want to wait until it was scientifically valid 
in ten years before they could use synergology” (Collignon, 2012, 
our translation). These meanings have also been disseminated at 
seminars and conferences, some of which were aimed at security and 
justice professionals. For example, the Bar of Quebec, the professional 
governing body of lawyers whose mission is to ensure the protection 
of the public, made two online training courses available until 2015. 
These training courses promoted concepts specific to synergology, 
which was presented as a discipline that is “based on a rigorous 
scientific approach” (Barreau du Québec, n.d.a, our translation). 
For example, in the first training course (taken by 1,929 members 
of the Bar of Quebec; Lagacé, 2015), lawyers were taught that if a 
person “squeezes his/her lips, holds his/her right hand, recounts the 
past by looking to the right, scratches his/her neck back to the right, 
and makes low and limited movements” (Barreau du Québec, n.d.a, 
our translation), it would indicate lying. In the second training course 
taken by 1,083 lawyers (Lagacé, 2015), the concepts presented had 
no stronger scientific foundation. For example, “open hands, exposed 
palms that move freely as the person speaks, and soft wrists indicate 
open communication where nothing is hidden” (Barreau du Québec, 
n.d.b, our translation). However, the use of such behavioral indicators 
(or combinations of some of them) has no scientific foundation 
(Hartwig & Bond, 2011, 2014; Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2002; see also Vrij, 
Hartwig, & Granhag, 2019, for a recent review of scientific research on 
nonverbal communication and deception detection).
In addition to the Bar of Quebec, proponents of synergology claim 
to have assisted, trained, or otherwise had as clients professionals in 
positions of trust or authority, including police officers and judges 
of Québec courts (e.g., Régie du logement du Québec, Commission 
des lésions professionnelles, Municipal Court of the City of Montreal, 
Superior Court, Court of Quebec) (Denault, 2017; Denault et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, “official” training centers offer the 200-plus hours 
training to “become” a synergologist, notably in Belgium, France, 
Quebec, Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands (Institut Québécois 
de Synergologie, n.d.; Bunard, 2018; Synergology, the Official Website, 
n.d.d). In all these cases, the use of concepts specific to synergology 
by security and justice professionals can have very harmful effects. 
In Quebec courts, for example, if judges use concepts specific to 
synergology “having no more scientific basis than those used in 
medieval ordeals” (Denault, 2015, p. 9, our translation), the outcome 
of trials could be distorted, particularly when the evidence is limited 
to contradictory testimonies (e. g., at a sexual assault trial where the 
victim’s and the accused’s words are in opposition). Witnesses who 
tell the truth could be considered dishonest, and vice-versa.
In response to criticism, synergologists argue that questions 
should be asked to confirm or disprove a hypothesis after considering 
several behavioral indicators and other concepts specific to their 
approach (e.g., Bagoe, 2015; Gagnon, 2015; Gagnon & Martineau, 
2010; Institut Québécois de Synergologie, 2018; Story, 2018; Turchet, 
2010). This call to caution, however, is of no use if these behavioral 
indicators and concepts have not been subjected to peer-review and 
replication. Indeed, as with the Reid technique, training in synergology 
could increase the confidence of judges in their ability to detect 
lies, while in fact, the accuracy of their judgments could decrease. 
Confirmation bias, in contrast, could lead judges to ask questions to 
verify an erroneous hypothesis, to give more weight to the answers 
that corroborate it and less weight to the answers that contradict it 
(Porter & ten Brinke, 2009). In addition, also in response to criticism, 
other proponents of synergology argued that the current peer 
review system “offers an illusion of quality control of publications 
that reassures the less well-informed and enhances the image of 
researchers in the eyes of gullible people” (Loranger & Loranger, 2019, 
p. 79, our translation) and suggested that their approach is criticized 
because it is innovative (Denault, 2018; Jupe & Denault, 2018). Some 
proponents of synergology have also used other types of responses, 
including attacks on the morality and competence of the critics in 
an attempt to discredit their arguments without responding to the 
substance of those arguments (Denault, 2018; Denault et al., 2015; 
Walton, 1987)4.
In spite of all this, synergology is now entering a new field 
of application, that of identifying potential threats through the 
analysis of nonverbal behaviors and preventing terrorist acts. 
For example, a “specialized training in practical recognition and 
probable identification of malicious intentions of individuals or 
groups of individuals through the learning of known techniques 
of synergology and new safety concepts” (Cellule SCAN, n.d., 
our translation; see also Gagnon, 2018) is now available. Given 
that the effectiveness of synergology is dubious at best and the 
effectiveness of using nonverbal behaviors for security controls 
at airports or to determine whether people are hiding an object 
is limited (Ormerod & Dando, 2015; Sweet et al., 2017), this new 
field of application of synergology is highly questionable. Its use 
for preventing terrorist acts is of even more concern because the 
effectiveness of a $1.5 billion program (the SPOT) whose goal was 
similar (the identification of potential threats through the analysis 
of nonverbal behaviors) remains doubtful despite years of scrutiny 
from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2017).
Why Do Some Organizations Turn to Pseudoscience?
The reasons for irrational beliefs have been the subject of 
extensive scientific literature. People’s critical thinking abilities, 
political, and religious ideologies, as well as cognitive skills and 
scientific knowledge are some of those reasons (Bensley & Lilienfeld, 
2017; Bensley, Lilienfeld, & Powell, 2014; Boudry, Blancke, & Pigliucci, 
2015; Bronstein, Pennycook, Bear, Rand, & Cannon, 2018; Gauchat, 
2012; Majima, 2015; Nisbet, Cooper, & Garrett, 2015; Pennycook, 
Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015; Pennycook & Rand, 2018; 
Shen & Gromet, 2015). But why do some organizations in the fields 
of security and justice turn to pseudoscience and pseudoscientific 
techniques? To an international scientific community that has 
published thousands of peer-reviewed articles on nonverbal 
communication, it may seem surprising that these organizations 
embrace programs, methods, and approaches that, on the surface, 
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seem scientific but, in reality, are not. We offer five hypotheses as 
to why some organizations turn to pseudoscience.
The Problems to Solve
First, organizations in the fields of security and justice may 
be confronted with problems that these programs, methods, and 
approaches could apparently solve. For example, the importance and 
urgency of securing airports could partly explain why SPOT has been 
implemented at numerous U.S. airports. The desire to implement 
better professional practices could partly explain why the BAI is an 
interview method used by many police forces and why synergology 
has been taught to French-speaking security and justice professionals. 
The issues may also be exacerbated or mitigated by circumstances 
within or outside these organizations. For example, the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, likely increased the importance and urgency of 
securing airports. 
It is important to emphasize that, unlike scientific knowledge, 
pseudoscientific claims offer immediate and easy solutions to 
complex challenges. They are thus particularly enticing. For 
example, the work of security and justice professionals could be 
facilitated by the use of highly accurate lie detectors during their 
daily face-to-face interactions. While science cannot offer such 
devices because they simply do not exist, pseudoscientific claims 
can be tailored to the needs of professionals and appear to be 
nearly infallible. Practitioners with limited knowledge of science 
and seeking a silver bullet might find these claims quite appealing. 
Thus, offering a “guarantee” that training in the Reid technique 
allows to “increase your ability to eliminate the innocent, identify 
the guilty and motivate subject’s [sic] to tell the truth” (John E. 
Reid & Associates, n.d.c) can have a highly persuasive effect on 
some police officers. Also, the fact that approaches are presented 
as truly scientific can increase their credibility. Thus, the assertion 
that synergology uses “several revolutionary techniques and 
methods derived from the most recent discoveries in the field of 
behavioral sciences” (Gagnon, n.d.b, our translation) could convince 
organizations of its validity.
The Lack of Scientific Knowledge
Second, the lack of specific or general scientific knowledge could 
partly explain why some organizations turn to pseudoscience and 
pseudoscientific techniques. For example, knowledge of the state 
of scientific research on nonverbal communication makes it easy to 
recognize the true nature of the indicators conveyed by SPOT, the 
BAI, and synergology. However, awareness and understanding of the 
process of critical appraisal of knowledge could overcome the lack of 
specific scientific knowledge. Indeed, when science is implicitly or 
explicitly invoked to legitimize programs, methods, and approaches, 
peer-reviewed articles that demonstrate their effectiveness should be 
requested and reviewed (to assess their relevance), regardless of the 
status of the individuals promoting those programs, methods, and 
approaches. 
The following example illustrates the importance of this advice. 
In 2015, the founder of synergology (who was then pursuing a PhD 
in language sciences and who obtained it two years later; Turchet, 
2017) sent a formal notice to a columnist requiring him to retract 
and apologize for criticizing him in a series of texts published in 
a French-language daily newspaper from Montreal. In this formal 
notice, which was also shared on social media by proponents of 
synergology, a number of references were cited, arguing that the 
columnist should have mentioned them. However, these references 
did not validate the meanings associated by synergologists to 
different gestures or the effectiveness of synergology. In fact, after 
reviewing the references, it became apparent that “there was 
no interest in considering them in order to determine whether 
synergology is a sham or not” (Denault et al., 2015, p. 440, our 
translation). This episode is reminiscent of the 175 irrelevant 
sources cited by the TSA to legitimize SPOT (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2017).
The Ignorance of the Importance of Science
Third, even if organizations in the fields of security and justice 
do not lack specific or general scientific knowledge, they might turn 
to pseudoscience because they ignore the importance of science 
to improve their professional practices. Indeed, the importance of 
knowledge published in peer-reviewed scientific journals comes not 
only from the first critical evaluation by researchers with scientific 
expertise in the subject, but also from the subsequent critical 
evaluation of members of the international scientific community. In 
other words, organizations essentially have two choices: (i) scientific 
knowledge that, though fallible, can be supported or criticized 
because everything is accessible to do so, or (ii) pseudoscientific 
claims which these organizations must largely trust blindly. Without 
knowing the merits of the knowledge published in peer-reviewed 
scientific journals, pseudoscience can appear much more enticing 
and reassuring by implementing marketing campaigns and using 
logical fallacies (e.g., calls for authority; Shermer, 2002).
For example, to flaunt the merits of synergology, the following 
statement was used: “Who are the synergologists? Who are 
the participants, the clients who use synergology? Doctors, 
neuropsychologists, psychologists, pharmacists, investigators, 
economic fraud experts, high security special agents, lawyers, social 
workers, caregivers, business leaders, directors, interviewers. Any 
other users? Judges, lawyers, public relations officers from various 
backgrounds and so on” (Gagnon, 2015, our translation). However, 
as when the creators of the Reid technique state that more than 
500,000 people were trained (John E. Reid & Associates, n.d.b, n.d.c), 
such a statement cannot make up for the lack of scientific evidence. 
The Underestimation of the Dangers of Pseudoscience
Fourth, some organizations in the fields of security and justice have 
probably turned to pseudoscience because they underestimate the 
disadvantages (and overestimate the advantages) of using programs, 
methods, and approaches that, on the surface, seem scientific but, in 
reality, are not. Beyond the fact these organizations may overlook truly 
effective means because they pay attention to pseudoscientific claims, 
the use of dubious concepts regarding nonverbal communication can 
result in (i) failing to detect actual threats and misidentifying guilty 
individuals as innocent, (ii) misidentifying innocent individuals 
as guilty, and (iii) a loss of valuable time and money as well as 
reputational, legal, and social consequences.
Unless they have unlimited resources, it seems unwise for these 
organizations to invest time and money in learning and using 
concepts that have not been the subject of peer-reviewed articles. 
In addition, if some security and justice organizations are turning to 
pseudoscience, their reputation could be damaged, especially if it 
becomes public, and more so if people or other organizations (with 
whom they do business) assume that best professional practices are 
being used. The legal and social consequences are no less significant. 
When they turn to pseudoscience, these organizations are exposed 
to risks, such as when physicians omit to consult research findings in 
scientific journals and treat their patients with programs, methods, 
and approaches that have not been scientifically supported. In 
other words, when they are sued because their patients have 
suffered harm that could have been prevented by using evidence-
based practices, physicians may find themselves in an unfortunate 
position (Cohen & Eisenber, 2012; Cohen & Kemper, 2005; Foster, 
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Schwartz, & DeRenzo, 2002). First developed in medicine in the 
1980s (Thoma & Eaves, 2015), evidence-based practices have since 
reached the field of psychosocial intervention (Eyberg, Nelson, & 
Boggs, 2008; Okpych & Yu, 2014) and gained growing popularity 
among security and justice professionals (Lum & Koper, 2015; 
Sherman, 2013). Because their mission is to ensure the protection of 
the public, professional governing bodies (including those outside 
the health sector) should therefore ensure that their members rely 
on evidence-based practices.
The Accountability of Researchers
Finally, when organizations in the fields of security and justice have 
unrealistic expectations stemming from television series and other 
popular media, and turn to pseudoscience, part of the responsibility 
lies with the international scientific community (Colwell, Miller, 
Miller, & Lyons, 2006; Denault & Jupe, 2017). Indeed, “the scientific 
process doesn’t stop when results are published in a peer-reviewed 
journal. Wider communication is also involved, and that includes 
ensuring not only that information (including uncertainties) is 
understood, but also that misinformation and errors are corrected 
where necessary” (Williamson, 2016, p. 171).
In other words, the international scientific community must 
promote more open access to knowledge published in scientific 
journals by disseminating it to the general public, as well as to 
organizations in the fields of security and justice that wish to 
implement evidence-based practices (Freckelton, 2016). More 
broadly, academics should also promote the importance of 
science, explain the strengths (and limitations) of peer-reviewed 
knowledge, and seek to provide accessible and convenient (and 
scientifically supported) tools to meet the needs of professionals.
Conclusion
The objective of this article was to examine (i) concepts of 
nonverbal communication conveyed by programs, methods, and 
approaches that fail to reflect the state of science, but also (ii) the 
consequences of their use by security and justice professionals. To 
achieve this objective, we described the scope of scientific research 
on nonverbal communication and examined a program, a method, 
and an approach that each run counter to the state of science. Finally, 
we outlined five hypotheses to explain why some organizations 
in the fields of security and justice are turning to pseudoscience 
and pseudoscientific techniques. These organizations (and their 
employees) may be acting in good faith, perhaps believing they 
are using the best professional practices. Good faith, however, is 
not sufficient for good practice. For example, SPOT created “an 
unacceptable risk of racial and religious profiling” (ACLU, 2017, p. 1), 
the BAI increases the risk of innocent people (especially juveniles and 
other vulnerable persons) making false confessions, and synergology 
could distort the outcome of trials and important decisions made by 
professionals in positions of trust or authority.
It should be noted that not all aspects of SPOT, the BAI, and 
synergology are incorrect. However, the use of some evidence 
published in scientific journals (embedded among a host of 
pseudoscientific claims) to legitimize programs, methods, and 
approaches that are not scientifically supported is a typical feature 
of pseudoscience. In other words, proponents of these programs, 
methods, and approaches can categorically reject the overwhelming 
weight of a vast literature that runs counter to their views, and select 
a few peer-reviewed articles that support them (Blancke, Boudry, 
& Pigliucci, 2017; Denault et al., 2015). For example, synergologists 
mobilize knowledge from laboratory experiments, including on 
issues related to emotional expressions and investigative interviews 
(e.g., Gagnon, n.d.a; Story, 2018; Turchet, 2009, 2012, 2013), while the 
founder of synergology stated that “what we absolutely do not believe 
in within synergology is experiment, because body language is made 
in such a way that when we participate in an experiment, it does not 
work” (Institut Européen de Synergologie, 2015, our translation; see 
also Jarry, 2016).
Although the dangers of pseudoscience in security and justice 
contexts are undeniable, security and justice organizations would be 
mistaken to reject anything that relates to nonverbal communication 
on the grounds that it is not always easy to distinguish scientific 
knowledge from pseudoscientific claims. In fact, the thousands of 
peer-reviewed articles on nonverbal communication are important 
sources of knowledge for security and justice professionals (Burgoon 
et al., 2010; Granhag & Strömwall, 2004; Granhag et al., 2015; Knapp 
et al., 2014; Moore et al., 2014; Patterson, 2011; Vrij, 2008). In addition, 
the usefulness of an individual’s nonverbal behaviors goes far beyond 
the detection of lies or mal-intent.
For example, in recent years, the field of study of thin slices of 
expressive behavior (e.g., using videos of a few seconds without 
sound; Weisbuch & Ambady, 2011) has developed in an attempt to 
understand experiential knowledge that results from intuition and 
that has a considerable impact on rapid judgments. This field of study 
has also developed in an attempt to increase the ability to accurately 
observe and interpret nonverbal behaviors, including judging an 
individual’s personality or propensity to psychopathology (Borkenau, 
Mauer, Riemann, Spinath, & Angleitner, 2004; Carney, Colvin, & 
Hall, 2007; Fowler, Lilienfeld, & Patrick, 2009; Oltmanns, Friedman, 
Fiedler, & Turkheimer, 2004; Stillman, Maner, & Baumeister, 2010). 
In addition, the usefulness of nonverbal communication in creating 
a trust relationship between a police officer and a suspect to gather 
information (Abbe & Brandon, 2013; St-Yves, 2006; Tickle-Degnen & 
Rosenthal, 2009) and the automated recognition of facial expressions 
(Mast, Gatica-Perez, Frauendorfer, Nguyen, & Choudhury, 2015) are 
merely some of the many issues on which peer-reviewed knowledge 
could benefit security and justice professionals.
Although some security and justice organizations are still turning 
to pseudoscience, others have already moved past programs, 
methods, and approaches that fail to reflect the state of science. 
In a number of organizations, researchers are already working 
closely with security and justice professionals to implement 
evidence-based practices (e.g., Centre for Research and Evidence 
on Security Threats, United Kingdom; High-Value Detainee 
Interrogation Group, United States). Therefore, we hope that our 
article will inspire all organizations, regardless of the importance 
they currently attach to scientific research, to reflect more on the 
dangers of pseudoscience and the importance of science in security 
and justice contexts. In addition, we hope it will encourage security 
and justice organizations to start or continue working with the 
international community of scholars who have scientific expertise 
in nonverbal communication and lie (and truth) detection to 
develop evidence-based practices. We also hope that researchers 
will see our article as an invitation to increase opportunities to 
disseminate their scientific work, promote the scientific method, 
and engage with security and justice professionals to limit the use 
of pseudoscience.
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Notes
1This article is a translation of the French article “L’analyse de 
la communication non verbale: Les dangers de la pseudoscience 
en contextes de sécurité et de justice” published herein with 
the authorization of the French journal Revue Internationale de 
Criminologie et de Police Technique et Scientifique. The initial 
manuscript of the French article was drafted by Vincent Denault with 
the help of Pierrich Plusquellec, Louise Marie Jupe, Michel St-Yves, 
and Norah Dunbar. The other authors read and commented the initial 
manuscript and subsequent versions. All authors approved the final 
version.
2The U.S. Government Accountability Office (2017) reported 
that the TSA revised the list of 94 behavioral indicators in 2014: 
“According to TSA, most of the 94 behavioral indicators were 
combined, condensed, or updated for incorporation into a revised list 
and a small subset were eliminated” (p. 3).
3It should be noted that following the report of the Boston Globe, 
the TSA curtailed the program: “Agency officials told the Globe that 
air marshals no longer document the minor movements and behavior 
of these travelers” (Winter & Abelson, 2018).
4For example, after having himself completed the 200-plus hours 
training to “become” a synergologist, the first author severed his 
links with synergology, transitioned to science by pursuing a master’s 
degree in law and a doctorate in communication, and published 
academic texts rigorously criticizing the use of synergology in the 
justice system (e.g., Denault, 2015; Denault et al., 2015). He was then 
the target of ad hominem attacks, including insults and disapproving 
comments on social media (Denault, 2018).
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